Privacy and data handling
Last updated 13 November 2026
Ed-Docs is operated by Seneca Highlands Intermediate Unit 9 (“IU9”), a public intermediate unit in Pennsylvania. This page describes what the system stores, what it logs, who else can see it and how long it is kept. It is written from the system as built, and it states the things that are not yet true as plainly as the things that are.
This page covers two different things, and the difference matters. This website — ed-docs.org — is a public page with no sign-in and no accounts. A district’s Ed-Docs instance is a separate application at that district’s own address, holding its board records. Sections below say which they apply to.
This website
ed-docs.org has no sign-in, no accounts, no forms and no payments. It does not use cookies, local storage or any other browser storage. It runs no scripts, and it loads nothing from any other company — no fonts, no analytics, no tracking pixels, no advertising tags and no session recording.
The only record of your visit is the ordinary request log kept by Amazon Web Services, which hosts the page. IU9 does not collect, read or retain access logs for this site.
If you email the address on this site, IU9 receives your message and your email address, in its ordinary email system.
A district’s Ed-Docs instance
Everything below describes the application a district’s board uses, not this page.
Where it lives
Each district’s records sit in a separate Amazon Web Services account controlled by IU9, in the AWS US East (N. Virginia) region. Each district has its own database, its own file storage and its own sign-in; nothing is shared between districts. The district supplies and owns the content, and IU9 operates the infrastructure it sits on.
What is collected
People with accounts. Work email address, name, display name, job title, role, board term start date, and whether the account is active. These are entered by the district’s own secretary. There is no self-registration.
Meeting content. Agendas, minutes and attachments, supplied entirely by the district. Describing this as “meeting agendas” would understate it: restricted agenda items carry personnel and employment matters, including appointments, resignations, salary tables and named lists. Minutes record named votes by named people on named matters, including roll-call votes, and are retained permanently as the official record of a public meeting.
Ed-Docs has no student records feature and asks for no student data. It cannot tell whether a particular attachment or passage contains any. What a district places in an agenda or a set of minutes is the district’s decision and remains subject to the district’s own obligations.
Technical logs. For every request to a district’s instance, including requests from members of the public who are not signed in and are simply reading a meeting notice: client IP address, browser user agent, time, method, path and response status. Kept for 30 days, then deleted automatically. This logging began on 5 November 2026.
Activity log. Every change made through the application: who made it, what action, which record and when. Retained with the district’s records.
In the browser. Sign-in tokens only, managed by the standard AWS Amplify library. No analytics, no tracking pixels, no advertising tags and no session recording.
Who else sees it
| Who | What they receive | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Amazon Web Services | All stored data | Hosting |
| Email address and basic profile at sign-in | Sign-in, where the district enables it. The permissions requested are openid email profile only — no Drive, no contacts, no calendar | |
| Microsoft | Email address and basic profile at sign-in | Sign-in, where the district enables it. The same minimal permissions |
| Amazon SES | Recipient address and the sign-in email | Sending the email sign-in link |
| Cloudflare | DNS lookups for ed-docs.org | Authoritative DNS |
| Google Fonts | The IP address of every visitor to a district instance, including members of the public who are not signed in | The application loads two typefaces from Google. This is being removed by self-hosting them |
Nothing is sold. There is no advertising relationship and no data broker.
Who at IU9 can reach it
IU9 holds administrator access to every district’s AWS account. IU9 staff can therefore technically reach a district’s data, including restricted material. This is stated plainly because the comfortable version would be false.
What is true alongside that:
- Every such action is recorded in an organisation-wide AWS CloudTrail log, held in a separate account.
- Within the application, access is role-based and enforced on the server, not merely hidden in the browser.
- Districts are isolated from one another. This is IU9’s access to its own infrastructure, not shared tenancy.
What is not yet true, and should not be assumed:
- There is no control in the product by which a district grants or withdraws support access.
- There is no time-limited support grant and no read-only support role.
Those are planned. Until they exist, a district that wants limits on IU9 staff access should set them in its agreement with IU9 rather than relying on the software to enforce them.
How long it is kept
- Agendas and minutes are permanent records of public meetings. They are not deleted on a schedule. Pennsylvania retention requirements apply to the board records themselves.
- Finalized records cannot be altered or deleted through the application by anyone, including the district’s own secretary. This is enforced by the server, not only by the interface.
- Access logs: 30 days.
- When a district leaves, what happens to its data is set in its agreement with IU9. Export is available and tested; an automated deletion process does not yet exist, so removal today is performed by IU9 staff.
Getting the data back
A district can request a full export at any time: every record and every attachment, with a SHA-256 checksum for each file. This is a tested procedure rather than a stated intention — it was run against the live district on 12 November 2026, producing 110 records and 1,264 attachments with every manifest entry verified.
Security measures
- A separate AWS account per district.
- Encryption at rest and in transit (TLS 1.2 minimum).
- Role-based authorisation enforced on the server; sign-in tokens verified by signature.
- Sign-in restricted to the email domains the district specifies.
- Attachment downloads authorised file by file against the requester’s role.
- Finalized records immutable.
- Organisation-wide AWS CloudTrail, GuardDuty and Security Hub.
- Security response headers on every page.
Not claimed, because it would not be true: SOC 2, ISO 27001, any other certification, penetration testing, or any third-party security audit. Ed-Docs has none of these.
Changes to this page
When what the system does changes, this page is updated to match, and the date at the top changes with it. A district with an agreement in place is told directly rather than being left to notice.
Contact
Questions about this page, or a request relating to a district’s data: ed-docs@iu9.org.